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Elevation of
Private Rights
to the
Constitutional
Level
Professor Christina B. Whit man,
University of Michigan Low School

Summary:
"In the last two decades it has
become increasingly common for
litigants to characterize as constitutional. rights that would previously
have been viewed as properly heard
under state tort law if they were to
be protected at all." Most recently
lower federal courts have been more
willing to recognize such constitutional causes of action than the
United States Supreme Court, but
not long ago the Supreme Court did
encourage such claims. In the early
1960s it turned an 1871 civil rights
statute into an effective vehicle for
litigation of constitutional actions
brought against state and local officials . While the actions of the
Chicago police in that case did represent an egregious violation of the
federal Constitution, they were also
the basis for a cause of action under
Illinois tort law. In a similar case in
1971, the Supreme Court read the
Constitution itself as implying a
private right of action for damages
against federal officials. Congress
has also supported the rights of
plaintiffs to bring constitutional
claims .
The tendency to see private rights
as needing constitutional protection
has increased the workload of the
federal courts, yet has not meant a
reduction in the caseload of the state
courts. "It has meant a shift in public
and professional attention towards

constitutional litigation," which, by
creating the expectation that all 'important' claims will be recognized
and protected by the federal
judiciary , may undermine state
authority .
Most constitu tional litiga ti on
necessari l y in.va l ves on l y c laims
brought against the government or
government officials. Constitutional
tort actions against private defendants can be brought under some
federal statutes, and the trend
towards 'constitutionalization' has
created pressure for ex pansion of
the 'state action' requirement or for
expansive interpretation of those
federal statutes that do protect constitutional rights against infringement by private individuals. However, a private right ordinarily
becomes the basis for constitutiona l
litigation only when it is infringed by
a government actor and where the
litigant can point to a constitutional
provision to make his case.
This has led the plaintiffs and the
courts to struggle to find constitutional bases for claims. What is
the source of the impetus to
characterize so man y rights as
worthy of constitutional protection?
This desire to convert private
rights into constitutional claims
results in part from the increased
involvement of government in the
lives of American citizens . Constitutional litigation also has a
special appeal for public interest
litigants who are interested in es-
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tablishing rules of general application and in attracting the attention of
the national press.
The impetus to cons ti tu tional decision making can also be attributed to
the desire to use the courts to resolve
questions of morality. While other
considerations are material in tort
cases, constitutional litigation
focuses on the issue of the propriety
of the conduct of the defendant, who
is typically the government or a
government official. A related attraction of constitutional law to
litigants is "the relative freedom that
judges in constitutional cases have to
draw on a range of sources for decision making." While tort judges are
more constrained by precedent,
judges in constitutional cases have
felt freer to look beyond precedent
to other historical sources and to
their own perception of popular
expectations and mores.
One questionable assumption
which is often implicit in the arguments of litigants who press for constitutional protection is that all our
values should be treated with equal
respect. Since there are logical and
psychological limits on the range of
values that can be treated as essential by a single society, and since
even very important values are frequently in conflict, the best approach may well be to reserve for
only a few values the ultimate sanction of constitutional protection.
What are the costs of failing to thus
limit the range of constitutional
recognition? The most significant
danger is that the value of constitutional protection will be diminished
in those situations where federal
intervention is essential and should
be available. There are four ways in
which expansion of the scope of
constitutional protection may actually dilute the ability of our society to
guarantee individual liberty:
through increasing the workload of
the already heavily burdened
federal courts; through too hasty and
abstract articulation of individual
rights; by denigrating the role that
the states can play in defending
acknowledged rights and in articulating new ones; and by deluding
citizens about the connection
between individual fulfillment and
limitations on government behavior.
The excerpted sections of Professor
Whitman's paper give fuller
consideration to these dangers inherent in increasing the scope of
constitutional litigation.

Excerpt:
The sheer number of constitutional tort cases imposes a
grievous administrative burden on the federal courts.
This is an extremely serious practical problem, but may
not seem, at first glance, to threaten the strength ?f constitutional protections. However, a crushing w~ight of
cases-whatever their individual merit-ultimately
diminishes all rights because the judiciary becomes less
capable of responding sympathetically _to ~ny_ s_ingle
claim. Simply as a matter of self-pr~servation,_mdividual
judges may begin to read complamts grudging!~ ~r to
look for narrow resolutions that avoid the most difficult
issues.
·
In order to process the caseload, the federal courts
have in the last decade grown dramatically as a
bureaucracy; we have far more judges an_d fa: more law
clerks assigned to each judge tha~ at an~ time i~ t_he past.
This too has its costs. The care with which decis10ns are
reached and the degree to which written opinions reflect
a consensus view inevitably suffer as a consequence of
decreased collegiality. Under tiII:e and_ work pressu:es
judges may be tempted-at least m routine cases, wh!ch
appear to lack importance, or in ab~truse cases, which
can be intimidating and time-consuming-to defer to the
recommendations of their clerks or to other judges who
are perceived to have expertise in a particular area.
Opinion writing may be largely delegated to law_ clerks
and increasingly divorced from the process by wh_ich the
judge reaches a decision. To save time and avoid co:1flict, appellate judges may hesitate to suggest cha~ges m
their colleagues' drafts, joining when they agree with t~e
conclusion but not the rationale. It then becomes difficult to discern a coherent approach in a line of cases or
to predict future decisions. Perhaps most significantly,
the job of judging may dwindle into an onerous and boring administrative task-one that cannot attract and
engage committed, intelligent people. .
. .
As the number of claims that receive constitut10nal
sanction increases that in itself may contribute to loss of
coherence and predictability. There will be situations in
which claims come into conflict, and judges then may
adopt quite consciously the role of compromiser, of
policymaker. Instead of defining limits on government
behavior by articulating a few inviolable principles, the
Court has, in the past decade, been increasingly forced to
work out solutions that give a little bit to each side ....
Debasement of constitutional values, then, can occur
when their protection becomes a boring task, and it can
occur through dispersal of judicial energy among too
many interests. The very concept of "fundamental"
rights seems ironic if every important right is to receive
cons ti tu tional sanction. Owen Fiss has written that " [w] e
have lost our confidence in the existence of the values
that underlie the litigation of the 1960s, or, for that matter, in the existence of any public values." In part we
have lost the certainty of the 1960s simply because the
problems with which we are faced seem much more difficult. Affirmative action has not captured the attention
of the public with the same fervor as the ~arlier claim for
equal treatment of racial minorities. Abortion has
proved to be a much more divisive issue than the right of
married persons to use contraceptives. Another reason
for our loss of certainty is our failure to remember that
only a few particularly important concerns can be given
ultimate dedication. As many, often conflicting, values
compete for attention, it is hard to retain commitment to
any one of them .... Constitutional decision making,
rather than common-law decision making, may also
impair the ability of the judiciary to protect individual
rights for the very reasons that make constitutional
avenues so attractive to plaintiffs-the conclusive,
all-encompassing, and relatively inflexible nature of
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constitutional rules .... Constitutional conclusions are
typically articulated with reference to eternal national
values .... Justices who sit in the seat of national government to devise rules of nationwide application and
significant duration, necessarily think and speak with a
degree of abstraction .... The Court may generalize from
the dramatic situation before it ... to devise rigid and
far-reaching rules that leave inadequate room for change
over time or variation in local conditions.
Tort rules, in contrast, are of narrow geographic scope,
easy to modify, and typically framed to be responsive
to the facts of particular cases .... The strength of the
common law has been thought to reside in its ability to
proceed through the power of judgment exercised on
particular cases, accommodating novel situations. Although it works towards universal principles of broader
scope through the doctrine of precedent, the common
law presumes that relationships among litigants, and the
circumstances that give rise to litigation will vary.
The tendency towards abstraction of constitutional
litigation has a leveling effect that may actually run
counter to the claims of liberty and freedom .... There is
a tension, often unacknowledged, between a constitutional plaintiff's claim against authority in the name of
individual freedom and his request for a national
answer, which assumes a universaJity of values and
needs ....
The tendency of cons ti tu tional li ligation to abstraction
is only intensified by the increased bureaucratization of
the court system caused by expanding caseload. As the
judiciary begins to put a high premium on the competent
and efficient disposition of large numbers of cases,
general rules that dictate results become much more attractive than individual decisions on the merits of each
case. A single judge, unless he or she is quite exceptional, will not be able, by sheer memory, to provide the
continuity through accumulated experience that has provided the safeguard of equal treatment of similar claims
in the past. Instead, clerks will be relied upon to ensure
continuity by research-into court files and past cases.
Once this burden is transferred to the clerks, there will
be an inevitable tendency to simplify and abstract, for
young lawyers clerk at the time in their careers when
they are most enamored of the rationalizing power of the
intellect and most suspicious of decisions based on the
reactions of experience to the equities of a particular
case ....
The expansion of constitutional protection may also be
unwise in that the format of constitutional litigation, in
contrast to tort disputes, emphasizes the citizen's claims
against society with little reference to society's claims
upon the citizen. To state a constitutional case the
citizen-plaintiff must assert a claim against government
authority, typically that government has gone too far and
must draw back. In a tort action, the relatively
equivalent status of the parties encourages us to consider
the reciprocal nature of the problem. Tort litigation
makes us aware that the recognition of a right on behalf
of the plaintiff necessarily means a constraint or a
burden imposed on another citizen or on an institutionthe defendant. The infinite expansion of common-law
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rights is nonsense, for every recognition of a right in one
person implies a limitation on the rights of others. Constitutional adjudication is less apt to remind us of our
obligations to each other. The problem is not presented
as one involving the coordination of the activities of
several citizens. Rights are asserted as limitations on
government action, not on the conduct of other people.
This is not accurate when the constitutional litigant
claims that the government is obliged to protect him from
other citizens-from those who discriminate on the basis
of race, or from those who pollute, or from those who
engage in criminal activities. Similar problems arise
when the constitutional right asserted is a welfare claim,
perhaps a right to a minimum level of subsistence. It is
tempting to see these as simple claims of citizens against
authority, but they are not. Like tort law, they ask the
courts to coordinate competing activities and to dictate
the allocation of resources among citizens. When the
relative value of the competing activities is clear-as in
cases of racial discrimination-the courts have not been
reluctant to impose constitutional resolutions, but they
have been understandably hesitant to recognize constitutional claims in most areas in which the claim for government protection is equivalent to a demand to be made
upon the resources or activities of other citizens.
The "rights" emphasis of constitutional litigation distracts citizens from the obligations that are otherwise the
corollaries of legal protection, and it may conceal the
true character of claims addressed to government actors
but actually made against the resources available to
other citizens. Constitutional litigation encourages us to
think of individuals as being most "free" when they
successfully assert claims against society, represented
by the government. In fact, we live in society, and
our responsibilities to each other may be as important to
our ultimate freedom as any limitation on government
action.
Those who would constitutionalize every private right
seem to have a rather exalted view of what political or
governmental solutions can do in guaranteeing individual liberty. Restraints on government behavior are
important, but all such restraints can do is to remove certain institutional obstacles to individual fulfillment. As
important as relief from abuses by government institutions is, a sense of responsibility for one's own life and
the existence of alternative institutions that can be a
source of strength and fellowship are equally important.
For example, the Constitution has been read to protect us
from discrimination on the basis of sex and race, but it
cannot give us all jobs in a depressed economy. Nor can
it protect us from our own lack of confidence or from our
inability to take advantage of opportunities. It does not
help us to resist the temptations of flattery. It offers no
relief from the casual cruelties of friends and strangers.
The gift to overcome these obstacles we get not from
courts, but from ourselves and from each other.

